I'd like to jump ahead several years for a moment and briefly consider the overal trajectory of the NSDAP during the 1920s. Some historians have spoken of the 'revolutionary' nature of the Nazi movement as a means of highlighting its 'radical break' from republican values. Others have rejected such a viewpoint, arguing instead that the Nazis incorporated various aspects of much earlier nationalist, right-wing groups and therefore should be understood in relation to more longstanding values and pre-existing political associations. The question comes doen to one of imagined continuity, whether or not Nazism--both in an ideological and organizational sense--reflects a subterranean element of German (or even European) history or it it is fundamentally unique and contingent upon a specific socio-historical conjuncture. (Of course there are those interpretations that posit Nazism as an essential aspect of modernity or the German character, but I do not place much faith in these readings.) Some more recent studies have taken a more dialectical approach to the question, translating it from 'either/or' to 'both at once'. Jeffrey Herf's book Reactionary Modernism (1984) is an exemplary model of this approach, recasting older discussion of the post-WWI 'conservative revolution' in a broader cultural dimension. Before Herf even, historians with a pronounced Marxist leaning, such as Tim Mason, had already started to put forward analyses that accounted for how the NSDAP could be both committed to maintaining inherited power structures--if only to better bend them to accomodate their own political goals--as wells as promote a complete reorganization of society. In his essay "Legacy of 1918 for National Socialism" Mason does not discuss this seeming contradication as I have formulated it, but he does touch upon it tangentially in a description of how Hitler combined two contradictory historical explanations for the empire's collapse in November 1918.
In speeches during the late 1920s-early 1930s Hitler employed the popular Dolchstoß, or 'stab-in-the-back' thesis for the collapse that was popular amongst the political right and was originally forumlated almost simultaneously with Germany's capitulation to the allies. According to this view, it was because of various 'anti-German elements' at the home front who sapped necessary support from the military that the country lost the war. Working-class parties and organizations were systematically scapegoated, as were 'foreigners', Jews and unconventional groups (homosexuals, etc.). On the other hand, Hitler traced a longer, more structural explanation for the collapse that emphasized urbanization, moral decline, materialism and the weakness of the imperial ruling class.
(more to come)
Friday, April 24, 2009
Tuesday, April 21, 2009
Extended Exegesis on Eberhard Kolb's The Weimar Republic.
As part of my study on the Berlin Dada movement I have had to conduct a far amount of research on the German revolution of 1918-1919. Several books have been helpful in this area. One of note is Eberhard Kolb's The Weimar Republic, part of the Routledge companion series to History. Kolb offers a general historical overview of the period with extremely useful maps and graphs, as well as a concluding section that discusses questions of historiography. In chapter two of this section, "The revolutionary origins of the Republic," Kolb outlines the major shifts in how historians have described the birth of Weimar since the end of WWII. His outline offers much food for thought.
According to Kolb a consensus was reached among historians after the conclusion of WWII regarding the German revolution and that this dominated the debate until the late 1950s. Emphasis was placed on the role of the German Social Democratic Party and their democratic credentials. It was argued that the party provided a democratic bulwark against the threat of the far-left and did the best it could given the overall situation it faced at the time. This line of reasoning partially reflected post-WWII political agendas. It buttressed the 'continuity' argument the Federal Republic of West Germany used to connect the newly founded state to the earlier republic of Weimar and thereby depict the Nazi period as a regrettable historical aberration. It also retroactively aligned the defenders of the Weimar Republic with the Federal Republic's anti-communist stance. Kolb does not explain how this worked out at the time, which, in my mind, raises some question, given the fact that Adenauer and the Christian Democrats not only were opposed to reaching out the SPD after the war but continued to castigate their 'communist' past--at least until 1959 when the SPD repudiated their Marxist heritage at the Bad Godesburg conference. Kolb does note, however, that the consensus view inadvertently supported a 'Marxist-Leninist' assertion that the radical left-wing of the revolutionary movement could have overthrown the National Assembly in 1919 had President Friedrich Ebert not called in the Freikorps.
In East Germany this line was de rigueur. Following doctrines first laid down by the Comintern during the late 1930s, the Social Democrats were categorically condemned for their 'counter-revolutionary' actions during the late teens and early 1920s. Before 1958, however, there were differing accounts of the November revolution. This was rectified by a number of theses laid out that year. Officially, the German revolution was defined as "a bourgeois-democratic revolution, carried out to some extent with proletarian means and methods" (150). Marred by ambiguity, this definition nevertheless touches on some very interesting questions about how we, and especially Marxists, talk about 'bourgeois' versus 'proletarian' revolution and whether it is always the class which benefits from a mode of production that is responsible for constructing it. Marx's 18th Brumaire and the theory of 'Bonapartism' seems to call such a mechanical conclusion into question, as does, in terms of Germany specifically, the work of Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn--I refer to their book The Peculiarities of German History, which critiques the once-popular Sonderweg thesis from a perspective sympathetic to Marxism. The biggest problem with the DDR's line was that it elevates the 'militant Marxist-Leninist party' to the sole determining force of history. Basically, the DDR historians argued that a revolutionary situation existed during the winter of 1918 but that the 'subjective element', i.e. proper organization around a revolutionary party, was lacking. Thus the revolution failed. This view remains influential to this day, particularly among current revolutionary groupings.
During the late 1950s and into the 1960s scholars turned away from their narrow focus on party politics and instead turned to look more closely at the workers' and soldiers' councils that sprang up after WWI and were the true loci of the revolution. Prior to this the councils had largely been viewed as inherently left-wing and proto-Soviet (in the bad sense), but as scholars examined them more in-depth they found that a significant amount of inner turmoil existed within these democratic bodies. They also discovered that, contrary to popular belief, the councils were largely dominated by the SPD, USPD and even bourgeois parties, not the Spartakists, who only had representatives in a few councils in the major cities. These facts refuted both the views of the 'Marxist-Leninist' historians and those who dismissed the councils as hotbeds of Bolshevism. Empirical studies showed that large sections of the working-class were radicalizing outside the control of revolutionaries. This suggests that, although they may not have been leading the movement, consciousness was moving toward the left. Kolb refutes this and is quick to assert that the votes by the council delegates in favor the National Assembly prove that the majority of delegates were for parliamentary democracy over a state closer to the 'Russian' example (153). This, I would argue, is a tendentious conclusion. It does not take into account the SPD's machinations to ensure that the vote would go their way, nor does it adequately consider the gap between the delegates support for the assembly and their simultaneous support for reforms that the SPD-led government was unwilling to grant. It begs the question: what did 'parliamentary democracy' exactly mean to these delegates?
Analysis of the the councils also suggested that their formation occurred in stages. In the first stage, immediately after their initial formation in November 1918 to the election of the National Assembly on January 19, 1919, the councils, Kolb claims, 'co-operated loyally' with the 'revolutionary' government and leaders of the councils saw them as temporary institutions that would give way to a parliamentary government rather than become long-term political institutions conferred with the power of the state. After January 1919 Kolb speaks of a second stage that lasted through the spring of that year (a period of mass strikes throughout the country). Kolb refers to a 'rapid radicalization' within the councils during this period, fueled by disappointment with the speed of reforms. Members began to turn against the government and the government resorted to armed confrontation to stem the radicalization, which, as usual happens in such situations, only spur it further. This radicalization was accompanied by a growing mass movement outside the councils. Kolb writes that it was only during this second phase that a 'councils ideology' emerged, i.e. the idea that the councils could serve as a permanent institution of class struggle or future state. This movement was dominated by USPD forces, although the KPD played a role as well--keep in mind that the USPD would split little more than a year later and the left-wing join the KPD.
As Kolb reports, the new information on the councils has led many historians to conclude that there was no imminent danger of a second 'Russian revolution' in the winter of 1918 and that the threat of the far-left was greatly exaggerated. This argument has an interesting component. Many historians now criticize the SPD for not sticking to its principles but instead succumbing to an irrational fear of Bolshevism. They blame Ebert and the leadership of the SPD for bringing into play reactionary forces that they could have sidelined had they been confident enough to question the strength of the far-left. In many ways this new line of reasoning serves as a kind of 'self-critique' of Social Democracy, holding accountable those who would sacrifice principles in the face of extenuating circumstances. Kolb insists that this revised view not be conceived as a 'third way' in discussion of what kind of government could have come out of the revolution had those in control made different decisions. To do so, he maintains, would give credence to the possibility of a 'dictatorship of the proletariat', a potential he believes has no historical grounding whatsoever. It is hard not to view the argument in this way, however, posed as it is in a 'what if' manner. While a full-blown socialist revolution may have been an unrealistic possibility in the winter of 1918 it makes more sense to me to delve further into the upsurge of radicalization during this period and chart its shifts than to return to a narrative that returns to a narrow focus on the efforts of a single party attempting to reign in a situation they could not control except by breaking with every conviction they ever held.
According to Kolb a consensus was reached among historians after the conclusion of WWII regarding the German revolution and that this dominated the debate until the late 1950s. Emphasis was placed on the role of the German Social Democratic Party and their democratic credentials. It was argued that the party provided a democratic bulwark against the threat of the far-left and did the best it could given the overall situation it faced at the time. This line of reasoning partially reflected post-WWII political agendas. It buttressed the 'continuity' argument the Federal Republic of West Germany used to connect the newly founded state to the earlier republic of Weimar and thereby depict the Nazi period as a regrettable historical aberration. It also retroactively aligned the defenders of the Weimar Republic with the Federal Republic's anti-communist stance. Kolb does not explain how this worked out at the time, which, in my mind, raises some question, given the fact that Adenauer and the Christian Democrats not only were opposed to reaching out the SPD after the war but continued to castigate their 'communist' past--at least until 1959 when the SPD repudiated their Marxist heritage at the Bad Godesburg conference. Kolb does note, however, that the consensus view inadvertently supported a 'Marxist-Leninist' assertion that the radical left-wing of the revolutionary movement could have overthrown the National Assembly in 1919 had President Friedrich Ebert not called in the Freikorps.
In East Germany this line was de rigueur. Following doctrines first laid down by the Comintern during the late 1930s, the Social Democrats were categorically condemned for their 'counter-revolutionary' actions during the late teens and early 1920s. Before 1958, however, there were differing accounts of the November revolution. This was rectified by a number of theses laid out that year. Officially, the German revolution was defined as "a bourgeois-democratic revolution, carried out to some extent with proletarian means and methods" (150). Marred by ambiguity, this definition nevertheless touches on some very interesting questions about how we, and especially Marxists, talk about 'bourgeois' versus 'proletarian' revolution and whether it is always the class which benefits from a mode of production that is responsible for constructing it. Marx's 18th Brumaire and the theory of 'Bonapartism' seems to call such a mechanical conclusion into question, as does, in terms of Germany specifically, the work of Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn--I refer to their book The Peculiarities of German History, which critiques the once-popular Sonderweg thesis from a perspective sympathetic to Marxism. The biggest problem with the DDR's line was that it elevates the 'militant Marxist-Leninist party' to the sole determining force of history. Basically, the DDR historians argued that a revolutionary situation existed during the winter of 1918 but that the 'subjective element', i.e. proper organization around a revolutionary party, was lacking. Thus the revolution failed. This view remains influential to this day, particularly among current revolutionary groupings.
During the late 1950s and into the 1960s scholars turned away from their narrow focus on party politics and instead turned to look more closely at the workers' and soldiers' councils that sprang up after WWI and were the true loci of the revolution. Prior to this the councils had largely been viewed as inherently left-wing and proto-Soviet (in the bad sense), but as scholars examined them more in-depth they found that a significant amount of inner turmoil existed within these democratic bodies. They also discovered that, contrary to popular belief, the councils were largely dominated by the SPD, USPD and even bourgeois parties, not the Spartakists, who only had representatives in a few councils in the major cities. These facts refuted both the views of the 'Marxist-Leninist' historians and those who dismissed the councils as hotbeds of Bolshevism. Empirical studies showed that large sections of the working-class were radicalizing outside the control of revolutionaries. This suggests that, although they may not have been leading the movement, consciousness was moving toward the left. Kolb refutes this and is quick to assert that the votes by the council delegates in favor the National Assembly prove that the majority of delegates were for parliamentary democracy over a state closer to the 'Russian' example (153). This, I would argue, is a tendentious conclusion. It does not take into account the SPD's machinations to ensure that the vote would go their way, nor does it adequately consider the gap between the delegates support for the assembly and their simultaneous support for reforms that the SPD-led government was unwilling to grant. It begs the question: what did 'parliamentary democracy' exactly mean to these delegates?
Analysis of the the councils also suggested that their formation occurred in stages. In the first stage, immediately after their initial formation in November 1918 to the election of the National Assembly on January 19, 1919, the councils, Kolb claims, 'co-operated loyally' with the 'revolutionary' government and leaders of the councils saw them as temporary institutions that would give way to a parliamentary government rather than become long-term political institutions conferred with the power of the state. After January 1919 Kolb speaks of a second stage that lasted through the spring of that year (a period of mass strikes throughout the country). Kolb refers to a 'rapid radicalization' within the councils during this period, fueled by disappointment with the speed of reforms. Members began to turn against the government and the government resorted to armed confrontation to stem the radicalization, which, as usual happens in such situations, only spur it further. This radicalization was accompanied by a growing mass movement outside the councils. Kolb writes that it was only during this second phase that a 'councils ideology' emerged, i.e. the idea that the councils could serve as a permanent institution of class struggle or future state. This movement was dominated by USPD forces, although the KPD played a role as well--keep in mind that the USPD would split little more than a year later and the left-wing join the KPD.
As Kolb reports, the new information on the councils has led many historians to conclude that there was no imminent danger of a second 'Russian revolution' in the winter of 1918 and that the threat of the far-left was greatly exaggerated. This argument has an interesting component. Many historians now criticize the SPD for not sticking to its principles but instead succumbing to an irrational fear of Bolshevism. They blame Ebert and the leadership of the SPD for bringing into play reactionary forces that they could have sidelined had they been confident enough to question the strength of the far-left. In many ways this new line of reasoning serves as a kind of 'self-critique' of Social Democracy, holding accountable those who would sacrifice principles in the face of extenuating circumstances. Kolb insists that this revised view not be conceived as a 'third way' in discussion of what kind of government could have come out of the revolution had those in control made different decisions. To do so, he maintains, would give credence to the possibility of a 'dictatorship of the proletariat', a potential he believes has no historical grounding whatsoever. It is hard not to view the argument in this way, however, posed as it is in a 'what if' manner. While a full-blown socialist revolution may have been an unrealistic possibility in the winter of 1918 it makes more sense to me to delve further into the upsurge of radicalization during this period and chart its shifts than to return to a narrative that returns to a narrow focus on the efforts of a single party attempting to reign in a situation they could not control except by breaking with every conviction they ever held.
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